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Introduction
The world population continues to grow but the rate is declining. The population 
reached one billion at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 3 billion in 1960, 
6 billion in 1999 and 7 billion in October 2011. The United Nations expects 
that the world population will reach 10 billion around the turn of the century. 
For centuries, the population growth rate was low, less than one tenth of a 
percentage per year. The situation changed in the nineteenth century (in France 
in the eighteenth century). The population growth rate started to increase because 
children were more likely to survive and women continued to have many children. 
The rate of growth reached a maximum of over 2 per cent in the early 1960s and 
has been declining since. Today it is 1.2 per cent and the United Nations expects 
the rate to reach 0 per cent around 2100. At that time world population growth 
comes to an end.1
This overall picture masks large differences. In Europe the growth rate has 
been low since 1950 and fell to zero at the end of the twentieth century. It increased 
afterwards because of migration. In Asia and Latin America the rate declined 
rapidly from 2.5 per cent in 1960 to about 1 per cent today. The rate remains high 
in Africa, well over 2 per cent, but is expected to decline too. These diverging 
trends have created a demographic divide between countries with rapidly growing 
populations and those with stagnant or declining populations. The regional figures 
mask large differences between countries and between socio-economic groups. 
More educated people have fewer children. The Demographic and Health Survey 
for Ethiopia revealed that women without any formal education have on average 
six children, whereas those with at least secondary education have two children.2 
More educated women generally marry later and less, use contraception more 
effectively, have more knowledge about and access to contraception, have greater 
autonomy in reproductive decision making and are more motivated to implement 
demand because the opportunity costs of unintended childbearing are higher 
1 Based on the 2010 Revision of the World Population Prospects, which was available 
at time of writing of this contribution. 
2 http://ethiopia.unfpa.org/drive/Fertility.pdf. Accessed 18 April 2012.
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(Bongaarts 2010). They also have higher aspirations for their children. Better-
educated persons also live longer and are healthier. Their children are less likely to 
die in infancy or childhood. A baby born to a Bolivian mother with no education 
has 10 per cent chance of dying during the first year of life, while one born to a 
woman with at least secondary education has a chance of 4 per cent (World Health 
Organization 2008, 29).
About 3 per cent of the world population of 7 billion (214 million people) lives 
in a country different from the country of birth (IOM World Migration Report 
2010). The proportion remained remarkably stable over the recent years, increasing 
only slightly from 2.9 per cent in the 1990s. Because of population growth, the 
size of the foreign-born population increased. In Europe and Northern America the 
proportion of the foreign-born population increased substantially from 6.9 per cent 
in 1990 to 9.5 per cent in 2010 in Europe3 and from 9.8 per cent to 14.2 per cent in 
Northern America. In Africa it declined from 2.5 per cent to 1.9 per cent. In Asia 
and Oceania it remained stable around 1.5 per cent and 16 per cent, respectively.
How can we explain these changes and differentials? Population change is 
the outcome of mortality, fertility and migration. The human desire for a long 
and fulfilling life is the main driver of demographic processes. Throughout 
history, the majority of humans tried to postpone death, to prevent the children 
they could not afford and to find a good place to raise their children. Science and 
technology provided the instruments to control demographic processes but the use 
of these instruments was conditioned by economic and social change. In several 
cases governments and civil society, such as religious groups, have facilitated or 
inhibited the human desire for a long and fulfilling life and the dissemination of 
the means to accomplish that goal.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. In the following section, I describe 
the features the three demographic processes have in common. The mortality 
transition is covered on p. 20ff, the fertility transition on p. 28ff and the migration 
transition on p. 31ff. In the conclusion I discuss consequences and some policy 
implications of the mortality and fertility changes in Europe.
Demographic Transitions: Common Features
Figure 1.1 shows global observed and expected demographic change between 
1950 and 2100. In the early period, both the birth rate and the death rate decline. 
The birth rate is considerably higher than the death rate because, by 1950, large 
families were still a norm in many parts of the world, whereas infectious disease 
was not the killer it used to be in the nineteenth century and the first part of the 
twentieth century. Today low fertility is a fact in many countries of the world. Most 
couples prefer small families and a considerable proportion remains childless. The 
3 Europe is the region defined by the United Nations. It includes the EU27, Switzerland, 
Norway, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and a number of smaller countries. 
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United Nations does not believe that in large parts of the world, fertility below 
replacement level is a long-term trend. Replacement fertility is considered more 
realistic. For a long period, the declining infant and child mortality determined the 
trend in the death rate. The recent increase in the death rate and the future increase 
are associated with an ageing population. An old population has a larger death rate 



















































Figure 1.1 World birth rate, death rate and population growth rate (left 
y-axis), and world population (right y-axis)
Source: United Nations (2011).
The fertility transition and the mortality transition start much earlier in some 
parts of the world than in other parts and the paces of the transitions differ 
significantly. As a consequence, population growth varies greatly between regions 
of the world (Figure 1.2).











































































Figure 1.2 Population of the world and selected regions (in 
million), 1950–2100
Source: United Nations (2011).
The processes that underlie demographic transitions are intertwined with 
science and technology, the economy, cultural change and social and political 
processes. Some events, such as scientific discoveries, social revolutions, 
epidemics and natural or man-made disaster, trigger processes that have 
potentially large impacts on fertility, mortality or migration. ‘Potentially’, 
because of intermediate factors. Innovations in science and technology have no 
effect on demographic processes unless humans are ready and willing to adopt 
the products of that innovation. Three preconditions need to be met for people to 
change their behaviour. First, people should be aware that they can influence the 
processes that affect them. They should have sufficient self-efficacy, i.e. the belief 
that they can succeed when they make an effort. If they believe that success is up 
to God or another authority, they are less likely to do things differently than their 
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predecessors and their contemporaries. Second, intervention must be perceived 
to be advantageous. People should benefit from taking control over processes. 
Third, they should have the instruments to exercise control. In the 1970s Ansley 
Coale formulated these preconditions, which he labelled ready, willing and 
able (RWA). The context was marital fertility decline, but the preconditions are 
applicable in other areas as well. People increase their control over fertility, 
mortality and migration if they are ready, willing and able to do so.
The effects of science and technology and the other factors depend not only 
on how persons respond to opportunities for change, but also on how many 
people respond. If only a few people are ready, willing and able to change 
their behaviour, the population remains unaffected. If many change, the entire 
population changes. Demographic change is a diffusion process. The select few 
that initially are ready, willing and able to take control over birth, death and where 
they want to live, do not trigger a population change unless they have sufficient 
followers. When the followers exceed a given proportion of the population, 
spreading is irreversible, although it may take time. Coale, in a study with 
Watkins, found that if 20 per cent of the population uses modern contraceptives 
to control their fertility, the diffusion of contraceptive use becomes irreversible 
(Coale and Watkins 1986). Demographers used that finding to model the fertility 
transition (e.g. Hilderink 2000).
Population growth and decline, and ageing are outcomes of mortality, fertility 
and migration processes. Population growth is a consequence of declining 
mortality and high fertility. Ageing is a consequence of declining mortality and 
declining fertility. Migration has some effect, but not much. It may affect how fast 
a population ages, but not that it ages.
Transitions in mortality, fertility and migration have several common features:
a. Micro-foundation. Populations change because individual persons 
give birth, migrate and die. Individuals are the actors. In order to fully 
comprehend population change, we should understand why some people 
die prematurely while other people reach old age; why some women get 
pregnant and give birth at a young age, why other women postpone or have 
no children at all; and why some people travel long distances to start a new 
life while other people never leave their place of birth.
b. Embeddedness. The demographic processes are embedded in a context or 
environment; they are situated in time and space. The significance of the 
historical, cultural and political contexts for the demographic transition 
illustrates the significance of embeddedness. Processes interact with the 
context, i.e. influence the context and are influenced by it. The context 
of demographic processes consists of multiple levels. The first is the 
individual life course. Childbearing, migration and death are life events 
that may be triggered by other events in the life course or may be enhanced 
or inhibited by personal and situational factors. Some triggering events are 
situated early in life. Life-course factors include genetic predispositions, 
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early-life experiences, occupational status and occupational career, level 
of education, place of residence and migration career, marital status 
and marital career, employment status and employment career, etc. For 
instance the low fertility in Europe cannot be understood without insight 
in partnerships and strategies to balance work and family life. Changes 
in mortality from chronic diseases cannot be understood unless lifestyle 
(e.g. smoking) is considered. Migration is an instrumental behaviour, which 
can be understood only in relation to other life events. Marriage migration is 
different from family reunion and employment migration. The second level 
is the household. Household members exert strong social influence on each 
other. Some decisions, e.g. migration, are usually made at the household 
level. Other decisions are influenced by household characteristics. For 
instance, in societies with a strong son preference, the likelihood of 
another child depends on the sex of children in the household. If a second 
or third child is seriously discouraged, such as in China, and ultrasound is 
available and affordable, the sex of the foetus can be determined and sex-
selective abortion may be practiced. The third level is the community or 
area. Community variables include access to family planning services and 
health centres, sanitation, educational facilities, etc. Area characteristics 
include physical characteristics (e.g. to explain environmental migration), 
social, economic, cultural and political characteristics. The fourth level is 
the country. Legislation, administrative regulations, welfare regimes and 
policies affect demographic processes. They enable, enhance, prevent or 
inhibit processes. For instance, the high fertility in Sweden relative to that 
in other countries of Europe is attributed to policy measures supporting 
gender equality. In France it is the availability and affordability of child 
care. The fifth level is the supra-national level, consisting of groups 
of countries (e.g. European Union) or organizations at the global level 
(e.g. United Nations, World Bank, Population Council, Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, the International Organization for Migration). The 
embeddedness is illustrated in the many studies that view demographic 
transitions as part of larger transformations in society pointing at the 
influence of industrialization, urbanization and secularization in the early 
stages of the fertility transition in Europe and individualization in the later 
stages of the transition.
c. Path dependence. The outcome of a process depends not only on current 
conditions, but also on the history and the dynamics of the process. A 
number of mechanisms exist that produce path dependence. (i) Events 
during early stages of the process may have long-term consequences. 
For instance, the dominant method of birth control in early stages of 
the fertility transition may remain the dominant method for a long time. 
Examples include abortion in Russia, sterilization in India and condoms 
in Japan. Adoption of these dominant methods in these countries is related 
to particular conditions, actors or policies during the very first stages of 
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the transition and positive feedback mechanisms that reinforce practices 
adopted during early stages (Arthur 1989). (ii) During the evolution of a 
process, institutions (including rules and organizations) may emerge or 
be established to facilitate, inhibit or monitor the process. Reproductive 
health programmes and border control policies are examples of such 
institutions, affecting fertility and migration, respectively. Institutions are 
usually context-specific. Feedback between individual behaviour and the 
evolving institutions induces path-dependent transitions. (iii) The transition 
processes depend on social interaction. Styles of communication in social 
networks and media vary greatly in time and space. The dynamics that 
result from the interaction influences the outcome of the process (for a 
discussion, see Kohler 1997).
d. Transition is a diffusion process. The demographic transition from high 
to low fertility and mortality and low to high migration involves the 
transmission of innovative attitudes (about the family, the need to live a 
healthy life, emigration) and behaviour (e.g., birth control method use, 
personal hygiene, physical exercise) from some individuals to others. The 
diffusion of innovation has much in common with the spread of infections 
and epidemics. Travel and migration are important factors in the spatial 
(geographic) diffusion. For instance, trade played an important role in the 
spread of the Black Death in the fourteenth century and migration played 
an important role in the spread of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa. In 
demography the study of diffusion mechanisms is of a more recent date 
(see e.g. Committee on Population 1999). Ideas, opinions, attitudes and 
information on health and family planning practices are transmitted through 
communication channels. These include mass media and interpersonal 
communication channels. Communication is more likely to take place 
between individuals who frequently interact or who are similar (e.g. peers, 
colleagues, neighbours, etc.). The role of diffusion processes for the 
demographic transitions has two consequences. The first is a divergence 
followed by a convergence. Since some groups respond before other 
groups do, the divergence in a population increases. When more people 
respond, convergence sets in. The second is the increased response rate 
among newcomers. A population that starts a transition late, i.e. when 
other populations (e.g. other countries) are already in an advanced stage, 
has a higher response rate. In developing countries mortality and fertility 
declined more rapidly than in Europe, where the start was earlier. The 
reason is that newcomers have access to knowledge and instruments; they 
do not need to develop methods of disease control and fertility control but 
can rely on existing methods.
e. Primacy of the individual. The demographic transitions are part of larger 
transformations in society. In the later stages of mortality, fertility and 
migration transitions, a significant feature is the primacy of the individual. 
Individuals get more personal autonomy in choosing the lifestyle and 
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life course they want but at the same time they are expected to behave 
responsibly while interpersonal relationships, solidarity (e.g. partnership), 
social institutions (e.g. marriage) and social support mechanisms 
(e.g. intergenerational transfers; social security) are reinterpreted. Over the 
years, the individual capacity to act independently and to make choices 
(agency) has increased while the role of institutions and social constructs 
(structure) declined (in relative terms). People respond to opportunity 
structures in their immediate and more distant environment (family, 
community, country, world). People also respond to what other people 
do. If some groups in society change ideas about family and children, about 
birth control, about living a healthy life or about the need to emigrate to 
improve living conditions, others are likely to follow and that ideational 
change may trickle down to all groups in society. That social interaction and 
the resulting diffusion of ideas represent the mechanism of social change. 
Since young people are more likely to adopt new ideas than old people 
(e.g. because of their personal opinion and peer pressure), the replacement 
of old cohort by new cohorts enhances social change (Ryder 1965). A 
population is composed of individuals, stratified by cohort or generation. 
Individuals born during a same period encounter major new opportunities 
and constraints in technology, economics or politics during the same stages 
of life and, as a consequence, their lives are shaped in similar ways.
The Mortality Transition
Mortality decline is one of the major achievements of civilization. One hundred 
and fifty years ago, 25 to 30 per cent of the children died of infections and other 
causes before the age of 5; today it is less than 1 per cent. Life expectancy was 
around 40. Those who survived to age 5 had a life expectancy of 50 years. Today, 
in Europe (EU27), less than one per cent of the new-borns die before age 5 and 
the life expectancy is 79 years, 76 for males and 82 for females (2009 figures). In 
Europe the mortality decline started around 1800 in France and at the end of the 
nineteenth century in other countries. Everywhere, the decline follows particular 
patterns. Initially, infant and child mortality declines and, as a consequence, adult 
mortality increases. Cardiovascular disease becomes the main cause of death. 
Smoking and food habits are important risk factors of cardiovascular diseases. 
If, as a result of cardiovascular risk management, the incidence of cardiovascular 
disease declines or treatment is successful, people get older and cancer becomes a 
major cause of death. In Europe, lung cancer is the dominant cancer death among 
men and may soon replace breast cancer as the leading cancer death among 
women (Malvezzi et al. 2012). When cancer is conquered and death is pushed 
back to very old ages, mental diseases (e.g. depression, dementia) are expected 
to become dominant (Meslé and Vallin 2011). The increase in life expectancy is 
remarkably stable. Since 1840, the ‘best practice’ life expectancy, i.e. the highest 
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value recorded in a single country in a given year, rose by about 2.5 years every 
decade for women and 2.2 years for men (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002). The leader 
of the league table changes almost every year, however, and leaders may enter 
extended periods of stagnation, as we will see.
The mortality transition describes the shift of high mortality to low mortality. 
That shift is characterized by the disappearance of diseases and the emergence of 
other diseases. In the first stage, mortality is high and erratic (fluctuates around 
three per thousand). Acute infectious diseases, famine, natural hazards and 
conflict (war) are the main causes of death. Children have a high probability of 
dying. Preventive measures such as safe drinking water, hygiene and vaccinations 
do not exist because the causes of the diseases are not known. Different cholera 
pandemics in the first half of the eighteenth century killed millions of people 
around the world. The killing stopped when in 1854 John Snow in England 
discovered that the infection was caused by contaminated water. That led to 
the preventive measures of piped drinking water, sewage treatment systems and 
sanitation. In the middle of the eighteenth century, mortality started to decline 
(Omran 2005). Several causes of infection, e.g. influenza, were discovered in 
the nineteenth century and preventive measures taken. As a result mortality 
declined further.
Today, mortality is low in the developed world, but remains high in poor 
countries. Many people in the world have no access to preventive measures and 
continue to face high mortality. Today 11 per cent of the world population has no 
access to drinking water and more than one third (2.5 billion people) lack access 
to basic sanitation. In the developing world, it is half (United Nations 2012). One 
in seven (13 per cent) does not have enough food and is hungry (FAO 2011). 
Because of these conditions mortality remains high and mortality disparity 
increases. In Congo (RDC) 18 per cent of the children die before the age of 5, 
about the same proportion as in Afghanistan. These countries are lagging behind in 
the demographic transition. High infant and child mortality keep life expectancy 
low, between 30 and 35 years. Every year, 1.5 million children under 5 die because 
of diarrhoea (3000 every day), 80 per cent in Africa and South Asia (UNICEF/
WHO 2009). It is the second leading cause of death among children under five 
globally. The main cause is lack of safe drinking water, sanitation and hygiene. 
Some years ago, Millennium Development Goals have been formulated to reduce 
preventable deaths.
In Europe, the decline in infectious diseases was the main reason for mortality 
decline until the first half of the twentieth century. Around the mid-1960s chronic 
diseases replaced infectious diseases as the main causes of death (Meslé and Vallin 
2011). Life expectancy was around 70 years. Cardiovascular diseases and cancer 
became prominent causes of death. It is interesting to note that at that time the 
United Nations expected the life expectancy to converge to a maximum value of 75 
years. That was before the cardiovascular revolution of the 1970s. But in the 1970s 
cardiovascular diseases declined as a result of life-saving treatment and prevention 
based in new insights in risk factors. For instance, in 1980 in the United States, 40 
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per cent of the people with an infarction died within a year; it declined to about 5 per 
cent (Weisfeldt and Zieman 2007). Epidemiologic studies, such as the Framingham 
Heart Study, a longitudinal study that started in 1948 and continues today, established 
the major risk factors of high blood cholesterol levels, high blood pressure, smoking 
and obesity. Coronary heart disease and stroke, the two major causes of CVD-related 
mortality, are not influenced to the same degree by the recognized risk factors. For 
example, elevated blood cholesterol is a major risk factor for coronary heart disease, 
and hypertension is the major risk factor for stroke. Physical activity, smoking 
cessation, and a healthy diet, which can lower the risk for heart disease, also can 
help lower the risk for stroke. The effect of obesity on mortality has been a subject 
of extensive debate, in part as a result of an assertion by Olshansky et al., (2005) that 
the rise in life expectancy could come to an end and turn into a decline because of the 
obesity epidemic. The debate continues. Childhood obesity causes premature death 
(Reilly and Kelly 2011) but obesity at higher ages (e.g. age 50) seems to increase 
disability but not mortality (Reuser et al. 2009).
In 1970, the life expectancy in Europe (EU27) was around 70 for males and 
75 for females. In 2009 it was 76 for males and 83 for females. Some countries 
deviate significantly from the average pattern. Progress was highest in Portugal. 
In 1970, it had the lowest life expectancy of Western Europe (65 for males and 70 
for females). By 2009, it had reached 76 and 82 years, respectively. The reason 
is that in 1970 Portugal had not yet completed the second stage of the mortality 
transition. It still had a high infant mortality (50 per thousand, the level of India). 
Infant mortality declined as expected and in 2009 it reached a low 4 per thousand. 
Russia is another extreme. In 1970, life expectancy at birth was 63 for males and 73 
for females. The female life expectancy did not change much. It increased a little 
(2 years) until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and then it declined until 
2002 and increased afterwards. In 2009, it surpassed the level of 1991. The male 
life expectancy declined and reached a low of 58.5 years in 2003. Today (2010), 
the life expectancy did not yet recover to its 1970 level. Lifestyle, in particular 
heavy alcohol consumption, is a major factor in the decline. The cases of Portugal 
and Russia illustrate a major trend of mortality decline, which started in the mid-
1960s: Western Europe and other western countries (and Japan) continued to make 
progress, while countries of East Europe and the former USSR experienced a long 
period of stagnation and even deterioration. For East Europe the stagnation ended 
in the 1990s, when cardiovascular diseases started to decline. Meslé and Vallin 
(2011) explain the differences in the rate of mortality decline by the differences in 
the rate of adoption of new medical technologies to treat cardiovascular diseases 
and new means of prevention.
Between 1970 and the end of the 1980s, life expectancy at birth in the former 
communist countries of CEE (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia), 
Russia and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) stagnated or declined. 
This led to an increasing gap between them and Western European countries. 
Within a few years of the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin wall in 1989, 
life expectancy started to steadily increase, first in the Czech Republic (1990) 
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followed by Poland, Slovakia and Hungary and much later by Romania and 
Bulgaria (Meslé and Vallin 2011). The rate of increase was not enough to close 
the divide between Western and Eastern Europe, although the Czech Republic 
is catching up. The reason for the lack of convergence is not clear. Leon (2011) 
suggests that the parallel change is the product of the diffusion of knowledge and 
ideas that improve public health and medical treatment. Some countries more 
quickly adopt new technologies and are more aggressively pursuing prevention 
and lifestyle change (e.g. anti-smoking campaigns, healthy nutrition).
Mortality decline in Western Europe is not uniform either. Two countries, the 
Netherlands and Denmark, have a deviating pattern. Around 1980, mortality in 
Western Europe started to diverge. Since mortality decline occurs predominantly 
at higher ages, life expectancy at age 65 is considered. Figure 1.3 shows the 
probability of surviving from to age 65 for a selection of European countries 
and Japan. In Japan, the survival probability increased rapidly in the 1950s and 
continued to increase until it levelled off in the late 1970s. In the Netherlands 
and Denmark, the probability of surviving to age 65 was already relatively high 
in 1950 but it did not increase much further, enabling other countries to catch up 
and surpass. In the Netherlands and Denmark, males experienced a decline in the 
probability of reaching 65. Figure 1.4 shows the probability that an individual of 
age 65 survives to age 85. Japanese women and men experienced a remarkable 
increase. If the 1950 mortality rates would apply, a Japanese woman of age 65 
would have 20 per cent chance to survive to 85. That percentage increased, in 
particular since the 1970, and in 2009 it reached 70 per cent. The changes in France 
are similar to those in Japan, but they are less rapid. Mortality improvements in 
Netherlands and Denmark stagnated, first for males (period 1950–2000) and later 
for females (period 1975–2000).
Figure 1.5 shows the life expectancy at 65 for a selection of countries. The 
trend is similar to that of the probability persons of age 65 survive to age 85.
Most countries of Western Europe experienced a steady increase in life 
expectancy. All countries benefited from the cardiovascular revolution of the 
1970s. In the Netherlands and Denmark life expectancy stagnated around 1980.4 
In the 1950s, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden were world leaders in life 
expectancy. The stagnation puzzled scientists. The stagnation in Denmark is 
mainly attributed to smoking and alcohol use, although a lower investment in 
health care than in Sweden may also have contributed (Christensen et al. 2010). 
In the mid-1990s the life expectancy started to improve again. The reason for the 
improvement is a decreasing cardiovascular mortality. Christensen et al. attribute 
the shift to a decrease in smoking and alcohol use and the introduction of the ‘Heart 
Plan’, which allocated substantial national funding to improve cardiovascular 
disease treatment. In the Netherlands, smoking has also been a major reason of 
the stagnation (Mackenbach and Garssen 2010). The stagnation ended in 2002. 
Mackenbach and Garssen attribute the end or the stagnation to a more active 
4 The life expectancy also stagnated in the United States.
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approach toward the treatment of seriously ill patients, associated with increased 
hospital admissions and life-saving and life-prolonging treatments. The improved 
treatment was facilitated by a sudden rise in government spending for health care, 
which started in 2001 after a massive public protest against the waiting lists and 
other problems of access to the health care system.
What may we expect next? The United Nations expects that the global life 
expectancy will increase from 68 years today to 81 year at the end of the century. 
In Europe, it is expected to increase from 75 to 87, in Asia from 60 to 82 and 
in Africa from 55 to 77 (United Nations 2011). Eurostat projects an increase of 
life expectancy in the EU27 of 7.9 years for males (from 76.7 in 2008 to 84.6 in 
2060) and 6.5 years for females (from 82.5 in 2008 to 89.1 in 2060), implying 
a convergence of life expectancy between males and females. Eurostat assumes 
that the life expectancy in the member countries of the EU will converge too. 
Therefore the organization assumes a larger increase in countries that currently lag 
behind (European Commission 2012).
The final stage of the mortality transition is characterized by a delay in the age 
at onset of degenerative diseases, increasing the life expectancy further. A question 

















































Figure 1.3 Probability of surviving to age 65. Selected countries, by 
sex, 1950–2012
Source: Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org).
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of growing concern is whether that increase also means a healthy life. In the EU27, 
the expected number of years in good health is 61.7 years for men and 62.6 years 
for women (Eurostat 2012; 2010 figures). At age 65, the remaining healthy life 
years are 8.7 years for males and 8.8 years for females. A necessary precedent 
for healthy ageing is the compression of morbidity. In 1980, Fries introduced the 
compression of morbidity hypothesis. It posed that the age at onset of chronic illness 
may be postponed more than the age at death, squeezing most of the morbidity in 
life into a shorter period with less lifetime disability. Fries assumed a maximum 
average life span of 85 years.5 Others emphasized the reduction in the fatality of 
chronic diseases. Advances in medical technology and public health are geared to 
keep people with a chronic condition alive. As a result, people would live longer 
in ill-health and/or with an impairment. The debate continues. For a number of 
5 Later, he clarified his earlier statement and stated that increases in life expectancy 
do not need to slow or to stop for compression of morbidity to occur. It is the relative rate 
of increase in morbidity rates and in mortality rates that is the important metric (Fries et 
al., 2011). 





























































Figure 1.4 Probability of surviving from age 65 to age 85. Selected 
countries, by sex, 1950–2012
Source: Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org).
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reasons, it remains difficult to establish the presence or absence of compression of 
morbidity. First, health status is usually self-reported and reporting varies in time 
and space. Second, it is necessary to distinguish between ill-health and disability. 
A person with a chronic condition, e.g. a heart condition, may live a normal life, 
provided adequate medication is available and affordable. Third, disability, which 
is emerging as the more important concept, depends on the availability of social 
support and other means to overcome the disability.
Epidemiological research reveals important inequalities in health and mortality. 
The inequalities are masked by population figures. Risk factors (in particular 
smoking and obesity) and socio-economic characteristics (in particular education) 
are important for health and longevity. For example, in the Netherlands, females 

























































Figure 1.5 Life expectancy at age 65. Selected countries, by 
sex, 1950–2012
Source: Human Mortality Database (www.mortality.org).
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and males in households with a disposable income per person of less than 14,000 
euros (in 2006) (low income) have a life expectancy that is 7 years lower than 
those in households with a disposable income per person that exceeds 28,000 euro 
(high income). In addition, they live 18 years less in good health and the difference 
in years without disability is 14 years (Knoops and van den Brakel 2010). Among 
men in the low income category, the age at onset of disability is 62 on average. It is 
76 for men in the highest income category. For women, the figures are 61 and 75. 
High socio-economic inequalities in mortality persist and even increased in several 
countries of West Europe (Mackenbach et al. 2003). Reducing socioeconomic 
inequalities in mortality critically depends upon speeding up mortality declines 
from cardiovascular diseases and other causes of death in lower socioeconomic 
groups. Recently, Kibele et al. (2013) found similar results for Germany: 65-year-
old men with the highest pension incomes could expect to live another 20 years, 
while 65-year-olds with the smallest pensions could expect to enjoy less than 
15 years of additional life. The average life expectancy is increasing among 
men of all social classes, but is rising much more slowly among men with very 
small pensions than among their better situated counterparts. It means that the 
demographic divide between the rich and the poor is increasing.
In developed countries, cardiovascular diseases are being conquered and 
cancers become the dominant causes of death. When medical progress pushes 
back the prevalence of cancer and people live to very old ages, mental disorders 
such as dementia may dominate. Meslé and Vallin (2010) expect a pandemic 
of ‘mental disorders and disabilities’. Alzheimer’s Disease International (ADI) 
estimates the number of people with dementia worldwide in 2013 at 44 million 
and expects an increase to 135 million in 2050. The growth will shift to low- and 
middle-income countries. The proportion of patients in low- and middle-income 
countries is expected to increase from 62 per cent in 2013 to 71 per cent in 20150 
(Prince et al. 2013). Meslé and Vallin report that some countries, like Japan and 
France, are already fighting successfully against the emerging pandemic, while 
other countries like the United States and the Netherlands are not as pro-active 
and are likely to be affected more by the pandemic. They attribute the difference in 
success not to a deliberate fight against specific mental disorders, but to differences 
in the attention to the health of the elderly. The authors admit that there is no 
definitive evidence for this interpretation and their conclusion is based on the fact 
that the United States and the Netherlands are lagging behind the mortality decline 
among people aged 80 and over. Although the ageing of the population will affect 
the prevalence of dementia, authors are cautiously optimistic that the incidence of 
dementia is declining, meaning that dementia is pushed to higher ages. In some 
countries, including the USA, significant reductions have been reported (e.g. 
Manton 2005). Recent studies in the UK and Germany confirm the observation in 
the USA (Matthews et al. 2013; Doblhammer et al. 2014). Better cardiovascular 
disease management, including a greater awareness of vascular risk factors, and 
a better education leading to a larger cognitive reserve are factors underlying the 
reduction in incidence (see e.g. Reuser et al. 2011).
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At the global level, non-communicable diseases (NCD), mainly cardiovascular 
diseases, cancers, diabetes and chronic lung diseases, are the leading causes 
of death, killing more people than all other causes combined (World Health 
Organization 2011). Nearly 80 per cent of NCD deaths occur in middle- and low-
income countries. In these countries, cardiovascular disease became the leading 
cause of death.
The likelihood of a major new infectious disease is low but it is not zero. 
If it occurs, the spread will be rapid because of patterns of international travel 
and trade.
The Fertility Transition
The fertility transition is the shift from high to low fertility. The transition started in 
France in the 1790s, immediately after the French Revolution, probably as a result 
of the role of women in the revolution that triggered an emancipatory movement 
(Binion 2001, 181). The social unrest that led to the revolution of 1789 was in part 
a consequence of inadequate food supply and a growing population (following the 
mortality decline in the eighteenth century).6
In the demographic literature, there has been and continues to be a debate on 
the causes of fertility decline. One school explains fertility changes as a response 
to changes in mortality. No declines in fertility have been observed in the absence 
of mortality decline. That school considers zero population growth as the natural 
state of affairs, a stable equilibrium. Built-in mechanisms, ‘preventive checks’ 
such as delaying age at marriage, would reduce the birth rate and ‘positive checks’, 
such as famine, misery, plague and war, would increase mortality. Other theories 
relate the demographic transition to economic and social development.
6 That is the context in which Malthus wrote his Essay on the principle of Population 
(published 1798). Malthus wrote the essay in response to essays by Godwin and Condorcet, 
two persons who were inspired by the French revolution and the idea of enlightenment. 
They advocated values of the French Revolution (equality): perfecting society (perfectibility 
or man) through continued social progress and through the growth of our insight in its 
functioning. The condition is universal education: ‘Without education, the perfection of 
mankind becomes impossible’ (Concordet, in Eichengreen, 2011). Malthus opposed the 
emancipatory movement and warned against the utopians of the French Revolution because 
social progress would inevitably lead to unchecked population growth and poverty because 
‘population, when unchecked, increased in a geometrical ratio; and subsistence for man in an 
arithmetical ratio’ (Malthus, 1798, II.1). For the same reason he criticized the English Poor 
Laws, the predecessors of the modern welfare state, because they would encourage early 
marriage. Malthus opposed the emancipatory movement in France and used the prospect of 
a population explosion and food scarcity to convey his argument. Sen (1999, p. 214) reminds 
us that Condorcet anticipated a voluntary reduction in fertility and predicted the emergence of 
new norms of small families, based on the progress of reason. For some remarks on Malthus 
vs Condorcet, see Van de Kaa (2010), McNicoll (1998) and Willekens (2014).
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These macro-level theories fail to capture the role of agency, i.e. the role of 
individuals and couples in the fertility transition. There are places in the world 
that experienced sustained fertility transition without economic development. 
Kerala in South India is such a place. Kerala combines a low level of economic 
development (measured in GDP) with a long experience of public health, child 
welfare and universal education, and its matrilineal system gives women a unique 
position in society (Nair 2010). Micro-level theories of fertility change emphasize 
individuals and couples and consider the costs and benefits of children, changes 
in values and aspirations (quality more important than quantity; self-fulfilment 
and autonomy; and desire for adequate standard of living). These changes at the 
individual level are made possible by technological innovation and economic and 
cultural changes resulting in a greater individual ability to choose. The changes are 
also influenced by inhibiting factors such as legal restrictions and social control 
mechanisms. In short, people should be ready, willing and able to control their 
fertility. The three preconditions must be met jointly to succeed (Lesthaeghe and 
Neels 2002).
Demographers describe the mechanism through which fertility is reduced in 
terms of proximate determinants or intermediate factors: proportion marrying, 
age at marriage (exposure factor), deliberate fertility control (contraceptive 
prevalence, induced abortions), and natural control (duration of breastfeeding 
associated with the length of post-partum insusceptibility, and spontaneous 
abortion or miscarriage). These factors affect fertility directly. Other factors, such 
as schooling and religion, affect fertility through the intermediate factors. Onset 
of fertility transition is commonly defined as a 10 per cent drop or more in marital 
fertility without fertility rebounding thereafter.
Fertility decline started in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century and 
spread to the rest of the world. In Asia, the fertility transition started in the 1950 
and 1960s and in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s (Figure 1.6) (Reher 2004). In most 
developing countries fertility decline is associated with a rise in contraceptive use 
to deliberately limit family size. Since 2004 the majority of the world population 
lives in areas with below-replacement fertility (Myrskylä et al. 2011).
Marriage and deliberate fertility control remain important drivers of fertility 
change. In recent times and in developed countries, control over fertility became 
almost perfect and the emphasis on individual autonomy and self-fulfilment 
continued and became more pervasive. Young adults who value individual 
autonomy are likely to delay decisions that restrict that autonomy. They are likely 
to postpone having children. According to Van de Kaa (2008), prevention of 
conception is the rule and the interruption of the prevention becomes a deliberate 
act. The growing emphasis on human capital accumulation (education) and the 
social expectation to be economically active and independent has a delaying effect. 
Education has a direct effect on postponement of childbearing (incompatibility 
between school enrolment and becoming a mother) and an indirect effect 
(opportunity cost of children increases with increases human capital) (Philipov et 
al. 2006). As a result of the emphasis on individual autonomy and self-fulfilment, 
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growing numbers of people reject traditional institutions such as marriage. The 
traditionally strong link between marriage, sexuality and reproduction has been 
relaxed. These factors create a condition for a sustained low fertility. In some 
countries fertility declined to extreme low levels with period Total Fertility Rates 
below 1.3. Part of the shift was due to postponement of childbearing towards higher 
ages. Because the changes, which were made possible by the availability of safe 
and reliable contraceptives, are sufficiently different from the earlier demographic 
changes, Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa mark them as The Second Demographic 
Transition (Lesthaeghe and Van de Kaa 1986; Van de Kaa 2008). Many European 
countries started to worry about falling fertility.
But then, quite unexpectedly, fertility in Europe started to increase. Was 
that turnaround the effect of catching up after a period of postponement or was 
it related to the further decline of the marriage institution? The erosion of the 
marriage institution had advanced enough to weaken the link between marriage and 
childbearing. Cohabitation is on the rise and an increasing proportion of children 
are born out of wedlock. Myrskylä et al. (2011) explored the positive link between 
Figure 1.6 Date of onset of fertility transition in selected regions of 
the world
Source: Reher 2004 (reprinted with permission, Wiley, 2014).
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high development and increased fertility and showed the driver is fertility increase 
at older ages but only in the presence of gender equality. Gender equality is crucial 
for fertility increase. In the Green Paper on demographic change, the European 
Commission (2005, 5) sees the low fertility rate as ‘the result of obstacles to 
private choices: late access to employment, job instability, expensive housing and 
lack of incentives (family benefits, parental leave, child care, equal pay)’.
What may we expect next? The United Nations (medium variant) expects that 
in Europe the number of children a woman has during her lifetime will increase 
from 1.5 to 2.0 (United Nations 2011). In other parts of the world it will continue 
to decline. The global Total Fertility Rate will decline from 2.5 in 2005–2010 to 
2.03 at the end of the century. In Africa it will drop from 4.6 to 2.1, in Asia from 
2.3 to 1.9. The United Nations believes that an equilibrium at zero population 
growth is a natural state of affairs. Eurostat expects the Total Fertility Rate of 
EU27 to increase too, from 1.59 in 2010 to 1.64 in 2030 and 1.71 in 2060. Fertility 
will remain below the replacement level. The largest increases in fertility rates 
are projected to take place in countries that have the lowest fertility rates today 
(Latvia, Hungary and Portugal). Eurostat assumes that in the long run fertility 
levels in the countries of Europe will converge to a same level. In 2060 that same 
level will not be reached yet. Fertility is expected to be highest in Ireland (TFR of 
1.99) and lowest in Latvia, Hungary and Portugal (TFR of 1.51). Scientists differ 
in their views on the future of fertility in Europe but they agree that fertility will 
remain below replacement for a long time.
The Migration Transition
Massey (2003) divides the history of international migration in four periods. 
The first period is the mercantile period (1500–1800). The dominant flow was 
people leaving Europe to settle in the Americas, Africa and Asia and the dominant 
reason was agriculture. During that period, 10 million African slaves were forcibly 
exported to the New World. The second period was related to the spread of 
industrialization. During the second period, from 1800 to 1929, 48 million people 
left Europe, with five main destinations: the United States, Canada, Argentina, 
Australia and New Zealand. The First World War and the economic recession of 
the 1930s brought migration to a halt. The years 1930–1960 was a period of limited 
international migration, except for the refugee migration in Europe. Around 1960 
international migration became a global phenomenon. Employers in Europe and 
elsewhere started to recruit immigrant workers (guest workers) because a shortage 
of native labour supply. Labour migration was mainly from South Europe to 
North and West Europe. Recruitment of migrants in East Europe was not possible 
because of the Iron Curtain. Only Yugoslavia allowed their citizens to migrate to 
West Europe. During the same period, colonies became independent. That event 
triggered considerable (return) migration flows. Massey estimates that, before 
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1930, 85 per cent of all international migrants originated in Europe. Since 1960, 
85 per cent come from Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa.
In the European Union, three phases of immigration can be identified in the last 
half century (European Commission 2011). The first is the guest-worker phase. That 
phase ended abruptly in 1974 when the oil crises produced a recession. Many guest-
workers did not return to their country of origin, contrary to the initial expectation. 
As a consequence, in the 1970s family reunification increased. Refugee migration 
(asylum seekers) increased in the 1980s and 1990s, and was related to shocks, such 
as the fall of the iron curtain, wars and ethnic conflicts. The 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees had an important impact on migration. The Convention was 
designed to protect people from persecution.7 In the 1990s immigration dropped, 
partly due to tighter controls. At the end of the 1990s it increased again and after 
2000 an annual net immigration of around 2 million was recorded before dropping 
to a net migration of about a million in 2009.
Today, globally 214 million persons are living outside of their country of 
birth, 3 per cent of the world population. In Europe, the foreign-born population 
is 9.5 per cent of the population (70 million). It is 50 million in Northern America 
(14.2 per cent of the population), 61 million in Asia (1.1 per cent) and 19 million 
in Africa (1.9 per cent) (United Nations 2009). In the 1990s countries in South 
Europe shifted from emigration countries to immigration countries.
A recent Gallup report (Esipova et al. 2011) offers a look at the experiences of 
people around the world who desire to migrate. The report is based on interviews 
with more than 750,000 adults worldwide since 2005 and provides information on 
the decision process and the effects others have on the outcome. The Gallup World 
Poll found that 14 per cent of the world’s adults (15+) population (630 million) say 
they would like to emigrate if they could. Only 8 per cent of them are planning to 
do so within 12 months and less than half (39 per cent) of those planning to move 
say they have already started making preparations. Most individuals stay in what 
the report calls the dream stage and do not continue to the planning stage and 
preparation stage.
Zelinsky (1971), who proposed the concept of mobility transition, linked 
migration to the demographic transition and to industrialization and economic 
transformation (see also de Haas 2010). Skeldon (1990, 1997) extended the 
mobility hypothesis by introducing the role of nation state formation including the 
colonization and decolonization. Colonization shaped migration along particular 
corridors and that path dependence contributed to the emergence of world 
migrations systems (see later). The link between migration and the demographic 
7 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes that, ‘Everyone has 
the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution’ (Article 14, 
Paragraph 1). The 1951 Convention is an implementation of that basic right and focuses 
on how States should treat refugees. At the end of 2010, 15.4 million people throughout 
the world were seeking refuge from conflict and persecution (UNHCR, 2011, p. 4). It has 
become a significant part of irregular migration. 
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transition is manifest. High fertility countries have a relatively large population of 
young adults, many of whom may be unemployed and eager to emigrate, unless 
economic growth in origin countries is sufficient to accommodate the demographic 
dividend. Low-fertility countries experience a shrinking labour force as the baby-
boom generation retires. The World Economic Forum (2011) estimates that ‘To 
sustain economic growth, by 2030 the United States will need to add more than 
25 million workers, and Western Europe will need to add more than 45 million 
employees’. Some see the global competition for workers, in particular skilled 
workers, a mega-trend of the twenty-first century. These drivers of international 
migration are largely situated at the population (macro) level and emphasize 
structural factors such as labour supply and demand. Development is defined as 
economic development. The drivers are formulated in terms of equilibrium-seeking 
tendencies (homeostatis) (migration as a labour-market adjustment mechanism). 
Proponents of this perspective consider an equilibrium between the demand and 
supply of labour as the natural state of affairs.
Communication and transportation technologies changed the landscape for 
international travel and migration. National borders and long distance no longer 
are the barriers they used to be. The UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) 
estimates that in 2010 close a billion people entered a foreign country as a tourist 
(940 million), 4.4 per cent growth compared to 2009. International tourism 
generated close to a trillion dollars in export earnings. In 2012 the UN expects 
more than a billion international tourist arrivals. The UNWTO defines tourism as 
involving a stay away from one’s usual place of residence of not more than a year. 
If the stay is more than a year, it is considered a permanent migration. Different 
types of migration involve stays of less than one year (e.g. temporary migration, 
circular migration). The distinction between tourism and migration is becoming 
increasingly blurred. Resident tourist and lifestyle migrants are concepts used 
to describe the growing international mobility in search for a better lifestyle or 
way of life. Torkington (2012) reviews the academic literature on the subject and 
discusses lifestyle migration between Northern Europe and the Algarve in Portugal, 
where people from Northern Europe are not considered immigrants but resident 
tourists, even when they settled permanently in the country. The label ‘immigrant’ 
is reserved for those of African, Asian and Brazilian origin as well as Eastern 
European labour migrants. A distinguishing feature of resident tourists, according 
to Torkington, is that they do not speak the local language and predominantly go 
to places where they meet their compatriots.
The increase in international tourism and different forms of international 
migration are manifestations of an increasingly mobile society. Many people are 
ready, willing and able to migrate in search for a better life. Technological change in 
communication and transportation enables a global community that is connected. 
Furthermore, globalization and the associated socio-economic transformations 
trigger new international migration flows.
Micro-level theories of migration consider individuals. Most people want a 
better life and many consider migration to achieve that goal. Some want to join their 
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family, others look for a school, a job, a partner, protection or a better climate. Some 
like to see new places and meet new people. Migration is instrumental to achieve 
particular goals in life. The desire to migrate is a consequence of the geography 
of opportunities. To most people international migration is a life strategy. People 
migrate for a reason. The usual types of migration such as employment migration, 
marriage migration, family reunion, residential mobility and retirement migration 
are manifestations of the dependence of migration aspirations on events and 
stages in life. Migration is not only part of economic transformation processes, 
but also of individual developmental processes. De Haas (2010) proposes to adopt 
Amartya Sen’s (1999) definition of development: the process of expanding the 
substantive freedoms that people enjoy. The capabilities approach to development 
emphasizes creating an enabling environment and opportunities for people 
to use their functional capabilities (e.g. ability to live to old age, participate in 
the economic and political activities) (see also Nussbaum 2011). It differs from 
economic development (measured by GDP); it is the intellectual foundation of 
the Human Development Index (HDI), which emphasizes health and education. 
Development means increasing human capabilities.8 It calls for increasing self-
efficacy9 by giving priority to health and education, and by taking down barriers 
to free choices. In Sen’s development concept, agency plays a pivotal role but 
agency in itself is not sufficient. The execution of agency requires capabilities. The 
mechanisms by which human development leads to higher levels of migration are: 
(1) increasing capabilities by loosening constraints on movement, (2) increasing 
aspirations and (3) increasing occupational specialization (de Haas 2010).
Migration flows exhibit strong path dependence. Once an immigration stream 
begins, the flow tends to be reinforced through migrant networks and migration 
policies. As a result, at the population level migration patterns emerge with 
characteristic migration corridors between places evolving into a migration 
system. A migration system is a set of places (within or across state borders) linked 
by flows and counter-flows of people, goods, services, and information, which 
tend to facilitate further exchange, including migration, between the places (de 
Haas 2010). The settlement of migrants in a place alters the structural conditions 
for migration through various feedback mechanisms. Migrants transfer money, 
goods, ideas and information back home. Thanks to cheap phone calls and flights 
emigrants are more likely to maintain frequent contact with people in their country 
of origin. They may cause ideational changes and produce new, transnational 
identities. Many of the estimated 40 million overseas Chinese (persons of Chinese 
descent living outside China), the over 30 million non-resident Indians (persons 
8 The capabilities approach is remarkably similar to the approach to development 
advocated by Condorcet at the time of the French Revolution and vigorously opposed by 
Malthus. 
9 Perceived self-efficacy is defined as people’s beliefs about their capabilities to 
produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that affect 
their lives.
Demographic Transitions in Europe and the World 35
of Indian origin who resides outside India), the 1.7 million Turks in Germany 
and the 150,000 Nederbelgen in Belgium are transnationals. In 2013, migrants 
worldwide saved enough to transfer an estimated US$ 550 billion to their countries 
of origin, 75 per cent or US$ 414 billion to developing countries (Ratha et al. 
2013). Remittances sent home by migrants to developing countries are close to 
four times the size of official development assistance and represent a lifeline for 
the poor. Diaspora and other migrant networks influence not only future migration 
but also trade and investment flows. The World Bank sees Diasporas as important 
sources of trade, capital, technology, and knowledge for origin countries. The 
Bank advises low-income country governments to issue diaspora bonds for 
infrastructure projects and market them to emigrants in rich countries.10 Ketkar 
and Ratha (2010) provide the rationale. Diaspora bonds are essentially a form of 
government debt that targets members of the national community abroad, based 
on the presumption that their emotional ties to a country make investing in such 
products worthwhile. Diaspora bonds are a way to capture part of the remittances 
for national investment projects.
What may we expect next? In the 2010 projections, the United Nations (2011) 
assumes that net migration in Europe remains constant over the next decades 
at around 1 million per year and declines gradually after 2050. Eurostat (2011) 
expects a limited increase of net immigration in the EU27 from around 1 million to 
a maximum of 1.33 million in 2020, followed by a decline to 0.9 million in 2060. 
Migration is more difficult to predict than mortality or fertility. The ignorance 
about what to expect explains the assumption that net migration remains at its 
current level. The assumed decline in the long run is likely to be based on the 
belief in the state of equilibrium with zero net migration is the natural state of 
affairs. Multiple disequilibria are more likely, because of conflict, natural disasters 
and other events that trigger migration flows. In addition, the geography of 
opportunities will continue to motivate people to consider migration in search for 
a better life. Technological developments are likely to take down further barriers 
to international travel, and short-term and long-term migrations. The nature of 
migration will change too. The number of transnationals, people who identify with 
more than one country, is likely to increase.
Today, 9.5 per cent of the population of Europe is foreign-born (United Nations 
2009). In the EU27, it is 9.4 per cent or 47 million (Vasileva 2011). About 31 
million were born outside of the EU and 16 million were born in another member 
state. Immigration cannot prevent the ageing of the population. It can delay it a 
little. In Europe, migration management and the economic and social integration 
of immigrants remain major challenges.
10 India and Kenya have issued bonds and Nigeria, Bangladesh and the Philippines 
are planning pilot projects (see e.g. Dilip Ratha’s blog on migration, remittances and 
development http://blogs.worldbank.org/peoplemove/category/tags/diaspora-bonds; accessed 
15 March 2014). 
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Discussion
In October 2011, the world population reached 7 billion. The population of Europe 
was 740 million and the population of the European Union (EU27) 500 million. 
In 1950, 22 per cent of the world population lived in Europe. Today it is 10 per 
cent. That figure will drop to 6.6 per cent in 2100 if the United Nations’ projections 
would become reality. Today, two-thirds of the population of Europe is between 
15 and 64, which is close to the world average, and 16 per cent is 65 and over, 
which is twice the world average of 8 per cent. Europe is leading the world in 
ageing. The other continents will follow, Asia relatively soon and Africa much 
later. Projections indicate that in 2100, 27 per cent of the Europe’s population is 
65 and over. The world figure is that every fifth person will be 65 or older. The 
projected figure is 26 per cent for Asia and 15 per cent for Africa.
These population figures are results of the demographic transition. Europe is 
leading because the continent was the first to start the transition and is therefore 
further advanced along the path. Other continents follow. In 2100, the transition is 
expected to be completed in Asia but not yet in Africa. As a result, the greying of 
Asia catches up with the greying of Europe. Europe and Asia will be of advanced 
age when Africa collects the demographic dividend.
During the last 50 years in Europe, the life expectancy increased two years per 
decade. That is a major achievement. The challenge is to live with that achievement 
and adapt. Lives should be reorganized because the lifespan has become much 
longer. That is essentially what many people are doing. They stay in school longer 
and postpone transitions to adulthood. They enter the labour market later, postpone 
a stable relationship and postpone having children (Lee and Goldstein 2003). Half 
a century ago transitions to maturity were compressed into a narrow age span. 
Today the transition appears to be becoming more diffuse and the transition period 
longer. Biological, institutional and behavioural barriers inhibit the adjustment of 
the life course. Women who postpone childbearing run the risk of childlessness, 
although assisted reproduction and adoption can be an outcome. Incentives for 
early retirement have grown with the generosity of pension programmes in recent 
decades. Traditional concepts of age continue to dominate the retirement debate, in 
particular the debate on retirement age. Sanderson and Scherbov (2010) advocate 
replacing prospective age for chronological age. Chronological age emphasizes 
years lived, while prospective age emphasizes remaining lifetime. If pension 
schemes would express entitlements and benefits in terms of prospective age, a 
condition would be created that enhances the rescaling of the life course with 
increase in lifespan. A side effect is a more sustainable pension system. Recent 
reforms that link pension benefits to life expectancy at (mandatory) retirement age 
are a first step toward prospective age.
Using prospective age rather than chronological age would also help the debate 
on differential retirement age. Today, few occupations (hazardous and arduous 
work) entitle someone to retire early (e.g. after a working life of 30 years instead 
of 45 years) with full benefit (for a review in OECD countries, see Zaidi and 
Demographic Transitions in Europe and the World 37
Whitehouse 2008). The rationale is that they are exceptionally demanding. An 
alternative approach to equity is to enhance that everyone has the same expected 
number of years of retirement. People with a low life expectancy at retirement 
age retire at a younger chronological age than people who may expect to live 
longer and, therefore, benefit longer. With increasing life expectancy, several 
inequities are introduced in the social security system because not everyone 
benefits equally from mortality reduction. In the Netherlands, females and males 
with low income have a life expectancy that is seven years lower than those with 
high income, and they spend more years in ill-health and with disability (Knoops 
and Brakel 2010). Disability starts at age 62 for men with a low income and at 
age 76 for men with a high income. The differences are even higher at age 65. 
At age 65, men in the lowest income category have a life expectancy of 15 years 
while men with the highest income may expect to live another 19 years. Women 
may expect to live 17 and 23 years, respectively. The differences are not taken 
into account in determining pension benefits relative to contributions. As a result 
people with low income subsidize the pensions of people with high income. In 
the daily newspaper NRC of 13 December 2006, Bovenberg, Mackenbach and 
Mehlkoph urged to end the perverse solidarity (income distribution from poor to 
rich). Recently, Bovenberg and van Ewijk (2011) called for more heterogeneity 
in pension schemes (longevity insurance). There is an urgent need for pension 
reforms that lead to pension schemes that are efficient, sustainable and equitable.
Equity also concerns the intergenerational transfer in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) 
pension schemes. In these schemes, the working population pays the pensions 
of the retired population. Funds, collected through taxes or premiums, are not 
accumulated but spent in the same year. If many contribute and few benefit, the 
premium is low. That is the case when a large generation (baby boom generation) 
is active. As the baby boom generation starts retiring, a shrinking working 
population (baby bust generation) is requested to finance the state pensions of an 
expanding retired population, implying an increase in compulsory social security 
contributions and a decrease in disposable income.
To illustrate the effect of ageing and the baby boom generation retiring, I 
offer an estimate of how much an individual member of the active population 
should contribute to provide each person over 65 an annual pension of €10,000. 
To keep it simple, I assume that all members of the active population, defined as 
persons aged 20 to 64, contribute. For details and the mathematical model, see 
Willekens (2010a) and for a more elaborate discussion, see Willekens (2010b). In 
1957, when the universal state pension (AOW) was introduced in the Netherlands, 
every member of the active population would have to contribute €1,587 per year 
to cover the pensions of the persons over 65. During a period of 50 years the 
amount increases modestly to €2,361 in 2007. The increase depends entirely on the 
changes in age structure of the population as a consequence of declining mortality 
and fertility in the period 1957–2007. Although fertility decline between 1957 and 
2007 is substantial, the contribution increases less than expected because the baby 
boom generation contributes in 2007 but not yet in 1957. The true effect of fertility 
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and mortality decline can be determined using a hypothetical population that is 
independent of the age structure of the population in 1957 and 2007, and depends 
only on the mortality and fertility levels in 1957 and 2007. The hypothetical 
population is the stable population. The growth rate and the age structure of the 
stable population are derived from age-specific mortality and fertility rates. If 
in 1957 the age structure of the population would be determined entirely by the 
mortality and fertility levels in that year, each member of the active population 
would have to contribute €1,904 to provide a pension of €10,000 to everyone aged 
65 and over, an increase of 20 per cent. It means that the real age structure in 1957 
was younger than expected on the basis of mortality and fertility in that year. In 
2007, the contribution would almost double to €4,615. The difference of €2,361 
and €4,615 can be attributed to the size of the baby-boom generation relative to 
earlier generations. It is the demographic dividend of the baby boom generation. 
Because of their size and the PAYG pension system, their pension contributions 
increased by not more than 50 per cent in 50 years. If the assumption that all 
members of the active population contribute is replaced by an assumption that the 
working population contributes but not the population without paid employment, 
then the contribution in 2007 would have to be 34 per cent higher (€6,154). If more 
members of the active population are gainfully employed (and pay contributions) 
and work longer, then the contribution increases less.
The decline in fertility that started in the mid-1960s with the introduction of 
the contraceptive pill, will have major consequences for the pension contributions 
of younger birth cohorts. Until the baby-boom generation starts retiring, the 
contribution does not change much. When the baby-boom generation starts 
retiring, the retired population is larger than what is expected on the basis of 
current and future fertility and mortality levels. The demographic dividend turns 
into a demographic debt burden that falls on the younger generation if the PAYG 
system is maintained. If the system is gradually replaced by a savings scheme 
(capitalization scheme) the younger generation carries a double burden: providing 
for the elderly and saving for their own pension. A policy option that limits the 
intergenerational inequity built in the PAYG system is to quantify to demographic 
dividend received by the baby-boom generation, and transfer (part of) it to younger 
generations. The funding source is the inheritance tax or estate tax, which increases 
substantially when the baby-boom generation starts dying. In future years the tax 
incorporates an important demographic dividend (collected by the government).
The pension premium may also be used to demonstrate the impact of 
increasing fertility. In Europe, low fertility has the attention of public authorities 
but policies are inadequate. Fertility increase critically depends on improvement 
in work-life balance. Countries with relatively high fertility have implemented 
one of three policies. First, labour market policies, with increase in part-time jobs 
(Netherlands). Second, child care (France). Third, gender equality (Sweden). 
These are the policies that seem to work. Suppose a policy is enacted that increases 
fertility by 30 per cent, meaning that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) increases from 
1.72 (in 2007) to 2.24. With the fertility policy, in about 20 years’ time, the active 
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population starts to be larger than without a policy and in about 65 years’ time, the 
elderly population starts to be higher than without a policy. When all members of 
the active population pay pension contributions and the retirement age remains at 
65, then the pension premium declines from €4,615 in 2007 to €3,972, a 14 per cent 
reduction. The annual number of births increases from about 180,000 to 200,000 
(the Netherlands). The number of births increases less than the TFR because of the 
relatively old age structure of the population. The impact of the policy measure will 
be felt after a period of about 25 years. First the pension contributions will decline 
as the additional children born are active. The contribution of €3,972 applies when 
the distorting effect of the increased fertility on the age structure is phased out. The 
example illustrates that the effect of fertility policies, even aggressive policies, on 
pension premiums in a PAYG system with a retirement age at 65 is absent in the 
short run and limited in the long run. To increase intergenerational equity, barriers 
to family formation should be removed and persons who raise children should 
gain pension credits in an individual notional pension account.
Ageing will not go away and Europe is leading the world in ageing. Individuals 
are adapting to the increased longevity by reorganizing their lives. The young 
generation delays labour market entry and family formation. They are likely to 
delay labour market exit, provided barriers to late exit are removed and flexible 
schemes are introduced that view retirement as a process and not as an event. The 
reorganization of the life course provides an opportunity to better integrate the 
different stages of life in a scheme that includes all life contingencies.
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